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Abstract
We analyse the welfare eﬀects of a publicly imposed smoking ban
in privately owned places like bars. In an economy where households
have heterogenous (positive and negative) attitudes towards smoking
bans, bars can use the smoking regime choice as a strategic variable. In
doing so, bars may endogenously implement a product diﬀerentiation.
Focusing on the possibility to separate markets, we derive the Nash
equilibrium of the decentral economy in a setting in which duopoly
bars compete in capacity and choose the smoking regime. We show
how the smoking regime choice is a function of the heterogeneity of
households. Moreover, we show that the social planer implements the
smoking regime obtained in the decentral economy. As such, impos-
ing smoking bans is welfare decreasing in an economy in which bar
landlords chose to allow smoking.
Keywords: Smoking Ban, Endogenous Product Diﬀerentiation
JEL: L13, I18, D61
1 Introduction
A large fraction of EU memberstates already has or is planning to implement
bans on smoking in bars and restaurants, see EU Commission (2007) .1 These
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1Many other OECD countries such as the US or Canada have also implemented bans
on smoking in public places, especially bars and pubs.
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bans are more or less strict, ranging from the obligation to have a separate
non-smoker room to the complete ban of the consumption of tobacco products
in pubs. According to a recent poll (Eurobarometer, 2006) more than 60%
of all Europeans are in favor of smoking bans in pubs; more than 70% would
like to see smoking banned from restaurants.
The exposure to active and passive smoking is a major hazard to health.
Smoking increases the risk for lung cancer, stroke and other pulmonary dis-
eases. In fact, the relative risk associated with passive smoking is highest in
pubs (see Jarvis, 2001, and EU Comission, 2007). Decreasing the health risks
of (especially second-hand) smoking is one of the main arguments which is
put forward by the advocates of a smoking ban. The economic eﬀects, posi-
tive as well as normative, are less clear.
The primary fear of landlords is that they will experience a large decline
in customers in case of a smoking ban. Most of the existing papers which
analyse the economic eﬀects of smoking bans, see e.g. the meta-analysis in
Scollo et al. (2003) or, more recently, Adams and Cotti (2007), actually focus
on the eﬀects on output and employment in the hospitality industry. The
consensus view of these studies is that the eﬀect of a smoking ban on bar
output/employment is by and large mildly positive.
The analysis mainly highlight the positive economic eﬀects of smoking
bans. Despite their importance, we believe that the normative question de-
serves some closer scrutiny. After all, the widely spread view that smokers
exert negative externalities on non-smokers is at least debateable. Arguing
along the lines of the Coase Theorem, Boyes and Marlow (1996) empirically
substantiate that privately owned businesses for the most part internalize the
externalities exerted from smoking customers on non-smokers. In assessing
the welfare eﬀects of smoking bans, we add to their analysis the following
observation. Although households know about the risk of (passive) smoking
and although the majority would like to see smoking banned from pubs, there
has been no decentral (market based) solution to this problem. Before public
smoking bans have been implemented, the choice of the smoking regime has
been a strategic variable of pub landlords. Most of them have chosen to al-
low smoking. This begs the question whether their choice reﬂects an optimal
situation or whether we have some sort of market failure which justiﬁes the
implementation of a public smoking ban.
To analyse this question theoretically, we apply a very stylised model in
which households derive utility from going out and consume pub services.
Households are heterogenous with respect to their attitude towards smoking3
bans. A fraction of households (the “non-smokers”) gains from the introduc-
tion of a smoking ban in that their utility from going out increases. For the
remaining fraction of households (the “smokers”), a smoking ban decreases
their (marginal) utility (and vice versa).
Given this demand structure, we derive the equilibrium chosen by two
duopoly bars which compete in Cournot fashion for customers and oﬀer an
identical bar service. As such, the bars are perfect substitutes as long as
both choose the same “smoking regime”. The duopoly landlords, however,
have discretion over the choice of whether to allow smoking or not. Thus a
smoking ban is an endogenous (and hence strategic) means of diﬀerentiating
the bar service.2 The Nash equilibrium of the smoking regime choice depends
on the fraction of ”non-smokers” relativ to ”smokers”.
In order to analyse the welfare eﬀects of a public smoking ban, we derive
aggregate welfare (given that ﬁrms are allowed to choose capacity) and inves-
tigate which smoking regime the planer would implement. We ﬁnd that the
planer’s choice coincides with the decentral solution. This implies that in a
situation in which we observe the smoking regime (as we did in the majority
of OECD countries), a public smoking ban unambiguously decreases welfare.
We organize our argument as follows. Section 2 presents the model. We
ﬁrst derive the decentral equilibrium (section 3) and then contrast the out-
come with the social planer solution (section 4). Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households
Consider an economy which is inhabited by a mass of one households. To
keep things as simple as possible, we assume that every household k goes out
and consumes a ﬁx amount of pub services (drinks, food etc.). Moreover,
we assume consumers to be heterogenous with respect to their attitude to-
wards smoking (or smoking bans) in pubs. Some of the households dislike
smoking bans whereas others like them or are indiﬀerent. We could argue
that this (dis)taste for smoking bans is an expression for the preference for
(non)smoking. With this, we assume a utility function which generates the
2This is closely akin to Mussa and Rosen’s (1978) notion of pricing quality-diﬀerentiated
goods of the same generic type when customers attach diﬀerent valuations to speciﬁc
attributes of the good.4
following marginal willingness to pay (for the pub service).3
q + (2θ − 1)ck, (2.1)
where q denotes the marginal utility gain from consuming the (ﬁxed amount)
of pub service; θ indicates whether the pub allows smoking (θ = 1) or not
(θ = 0) and ck denotes the additional marginal (dis)utility derived from the
smoking regime (depending on the type of household).
We assume the (non)smoking indicator ck to be uniformly distributed
over households, where we denote the lower bound of the distribution by −A
and the upper bound by B.4 Thus, the household with ck = A is the one
that values smoking in the pub most whereas at the same time (which is due
to symmetry reasons) it is also the one who dislikes a smoking ban most.
Using the marginal willingness to pay and assuming a price p that a
household has to pay for the consumption of bar services, we can derive the
demand function. That is, the number of customers in the case of smoking
bans (θ = 0) is
n =
q − p + A
A + B
, (2.2)
while in the situation in which θ = 1, i.e. pubs allow smoking,
n =
q − p + B
A + B
. (2.3)
Note that the only diﬀerence between the demand functions in the two smok-
ing regimes is that they shift upwards (or downwards) depending on the
attitudes towards smoking at the boundary points of the distribution, i.e.
depending on the number of ”smokers” and ”non-smokers”. The slope of the
demand function remains unchanged.5 This property is especially important
for the pricing strategy of bars.
3This modelling is inspired by Katz and Shapiro (1985) .
4We could alternatively assume some other functional form for the distribution of the
(non)smoking indicator. However, the uniform distribution generates linear demand func-
tions which are easy to handle plus the additional insight from more general functional
forms would not be too large.
5This is due to the assumption of the uniform distribution of the attitudes towards
smoking. Diﬀerent distributional assumptions may also yield diﬀerent slopes of the de-
mand curves in the diﬀerent regimes.5
2.2 Firms/Pubs
The (ﬁxed) bar service which is consumed by the households is supplied by
two bars. We assume these bars to make two choices. At the ﬁrst stage
they choose which smoking regime to implement (i.e. whether to allow or
forbid smoking). At the second stage, the bars make a capacity choice and
choose how many customers/households they are going to serve. Note that
the choice concerning the smoking regime at the ﬁrst stage is crucial for the
strategic environment that both pubs face. If both choose the same regime,
they end up in Cournot competition whereas when each bar chooses a dif-
ferent regime, both bar can act as “monopolists”. The monopoly behaviour,
however, is restricted to a part of households.
For simplicity, we assume that the (variable) cost of producing the bar
service is zero.
3 Decentral Equilibrium
We derive for the equilibrium smoking regime and output choice of the two
bars by backward induction. Hence, we ﬁrstly solve for the equilibrium
bar capacity given the smoking regime choice and secondly for the smok-
ing regime.
3.1 Capacity Choice
θi = θj = 0. In the regime in which both ﬁrms forbid smoking, the proﬁt
of ﬁrm i reads
Πi = pni = (A + q − (ni + nj)(A + B))ni, (3.1)
where we took advantage of the fact that the bars produce a homogenous
good, at least as long as the smoking regime is the same, and that n = ni+nj.



















θi = θj = 1. The proﬁt function in the smoking regime is
Πi = pni = (B + q − (ni + nj)(A + B))ni, (3.5)


















Note that the equilibrium proﬁt under this regime is larger than the proﬁt
in the smoker regime if B > A, hence if the maximum additional utility of a
smoker is larger than the maximum additional disutility.
θi = 0, θj = 1. In this situation both bars do not engage in oligopolistic
competition, but both can act as monopolists (on their part of the demand
curve). As such, the price of bar services need not to be the same since
arbitrage is not possible. Both bars sell diﬀerent products (i.e. varieties of
the same generic type).
The proﬁt function of ﬁrm i is
Πi = pini = (A + q − ni(A + B))ni. (3.9)
Although the non-smoking regime bar is monopolist, it has to take into ac-
count that implicitly its market size (the demand function) is aﬀected by
the capacity and price regime choice of the other bar. Thus, the bar has7
to take the implicit quantity restriction ni + nj ≤ 1 into account. Thus,
depending on the rival bar choice it is restricted in its optimization. The
ﬁrst-order-conditions for the problem of the bar read:
(A + q − ni(A + B)) − ni(A + B) − λi = 0 (3.10)
λi(ni + nj − 1) = 0, (3.11)
where λ denotes the Lagrange multiplier. With this we can distinguish two
situations. With a non-binding restriction, we ﬁnd the “usual” monopoly
result with ni = 0.5
A+q
A+B. In the binding case it is obvious that the bar will
only serve its residual demand.
The maximization problem of bar j is analogous to that of bar i. The
proﬁt function reads
Πj = pjnj = (B + q − nj(A + B))nj. (3.12)
The ﬁrst order conditions for bar j are:
(B + q − nj(A + B)) − nj(A + B) − λj = 0, (3.13)
λj(ni + nj − 1) = 0, (3.14)
which again imply that either the bar acts as a monopolist with nj = 0.5
B+q
A+B
or serves the residual demand.
The equilibrium in the case in which both ﬁrms have opposing smoking
regimes depends on the common marginal utility of households from consum-
ing pub services. If q 6 0.5(A+B) every bar can act as a monopolist. In the
opposite case, the equilibrium capacity of every bar (and hence its proﬁt) is















Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium for situations in which we observe an ”in-
terior” solution (the dotted lines), i.e. both bars can act as monopolists and





Figure 1: Reaction Curves in the case of θi 6= θj
3.2 Smoking Regime
At the ﬁrst stage of the game, both bars choose simultaneously which smok-
ing regime they are going to implement, anticipating the outcome of the
capacity game at the second stage. To solve for the optimal regime choice,
we hence have to compare proﬁts in the diﬀerent situations. When choosing
the smoking regime, ﬁrm i faces the trade-oﬀ between choosing the same
regime as ﬁrm j and engaging in cournot competition or becoming a monop-
olist. However, being the monopolist is obviously only advantageous if the
market is suﬃciently large.
Consider the regime choice of ﬁrm i (obviously the regime choice is sym-
metric for ﬁrm j). If ﬁrm j has chosen to forbid smoking (θj = 0), ﬁrm i will
also choose to forbid smoking if A
q > 0.5 + 1.5B
q . In this case the value of
non-smoking (in utility units of going out) is larger than the value of smok-
ing. Thus, being the monopolist in a small market is less attractive than
engaging in Cournot competition in the larger non-smoking market.
Note, however, that the opposite is not necessarily true. This is due to
the fact that ﬁrm i may not realise the monopoly proﬁt since the (aggregate)
market is too small, i.e. the households are too homogenous. With enough
heterogeneity, however (A+B > 2q, which we assume to hold), the ﬁrm will
implement the smoking regime if A











Figure 2: A taxonomy of equilibria
Similar reasoning applies to the situation in which ﬁrm j has chosen to






3. In this case, the value of non-smoking among households is
large. Considering again the situation in which heterogeneity is large, ﬁrm i






With the market large enough, these two inequalities divide the param-
eter space such that we can derive unique Nash equilibria for the smoking






3 holds, ﬁrm i will impose a smoking
ban independent of the smoking regime choice of the other bar. Hence, in
a situation in which the additional value of a smoking ban for the house-
hold who values smoking bans most is large, both bars will choose to forbid
smoking.






q . In this case the additional
value of smoking bans is very low. Thus, the number of households who prefer
smoking is large and so is the market for smoking. Both bars will choose to
allow smoking.
Eventually, there are intermediate ranges of A
q for which one bar imple-
ments a smoking regime whereas the other chooses to ban smoking. Which
bar chooses which strategy is, however, indetermined (due to the mixed strat-
egy equilibrium).
Figure 2 depicts the division of the parameter space for which the three
diﬀerent equilibria hold. Obviously, it is important by which factor the10
marginal utility of the individual who (dis)likes smoking the most, increases
(decreases). This is due to the fact that implicitly the size of the market (the
number of households that who are willing to go out) is determined by the
parameter of the distribution of preferences. A large maximum additional
utility of non-smoking implies a large fraction of household who prefer non-
smoking bars over smoking bars and vice versa. As such, implementing a
(non-)smoking regime generates a large demand. As long as the market is
large enough, acting as duopolist is more attractive than monopolistically
serving the “niche” demand.
4 Central Equilibrium
The public policy in most OECD countries over the last ﬁve years or so
has aimed at implementing smoking bans for pubs and restaurants. Before
these smoking bans came into eﬀect, we have observed situations in which
smoking was allowed in basically all pubs and bars (at least in Europe)
although bar owners could have implemented smoking bans themselves. In
light of the model, we conclude that households in these economies only gain
a low maximum marginal utility from a privately imposed smoking ban (at
least compared to its marginal “costs”).6
Given this reasoning, two interesting question arise. First, what are the
welfare eﬀects of smoking bans if parameters are such that the decentral
equilibrium gives rise to smoking regimes? Second (and more important),
what is the optimal policy that a social planer should implement?
Aggregate welfare in the economy consist of the utility of consumers who
participate in the market, go out and consume pub services. Additionally,
the proﬁt of the ﬁrms have to be taken into account. In the situation in
which θi = θj = 0, welfare is hence given by
W(θi = θj = 0) = (A − 1/3(A + q))2/3
A + q






A + B | {z }
Aggregate Proﬁt
, (4.1)
6Since we are not aware of large scale protests by household for a public smoking ban in
pubs, we think it is save to conclude that bar owners have been anticipated the preference
distribution correctly.11
whereas when both bars choose the smoking regime, welfare is
W(θi = θj = 1) = (B − 1/3(B + q))2/3
B + q






A + B | {z }
Aggregate Proﬁt
. (4.2)
Eventually, in the situation of a mixed smoking regime, welfare is given by:
W(θi = 0,θj = 1) =
(A + q − 1/2(A + q))1/2
A + q
A + B
+ (B + q − 1/2(B + q))1/2
B + q











Using these welfare measures, we are able to rank the equilibria in the econ-
omy. The ranking is, obviously, a function of the number of individuals with
a positive (negative) attitude towards (non-)smoking. If A
q > B
q , i.e. the
fraction of non-smokers is very large, W(θi = θj = 0) > W(θi = θj = 1).
If, however, this fraction is not large enough A
q < 1.5B
q + 1/3, welfare in
the mixed equilibrium is larger than under the non-smoking regime. Accord-
ingly, if A
q > 2/3B
q − 1/3, welfare in the mixed equilibrium exceeds that of
the smoking regime. Hence, the welfare ranking of the equilibria replicates
the choices in the decentral economy. As such, imposing a smoking ban in an
economy that was characterised by restaurants and pubs in which smoking
was (at least partly) allowed results in a welfare loss. Moreover, the social
planer prefers mixed regimes in all situations in which the attitude towards
smoking bans in the economy is not too heterogeneous.
5 Conclusion
This paper analyses the strategic eﬀects of an additional characteristic of the
service provided by a pub, namely whether smoking is allowed or banned.
In an economy in which the (positive or negative) attitude towards smoking
is uniformly distributed over households, pubs compete for the number of
guests in a Cournot fashion. Additionally to choosing their optimal capacity,
pubs also decide over which smoking regime to implement. We derive the12
Nash equilibrium for this decision and show how the smoking regime in the
economy is driven by the relation between the number of households who have
a positive and a negative attitude towards smoking. If this heterogeneity is
not too large, we observe a ”mixed” smoking regime, i.e. a situation where
one bar allows smoking while the other bar bans smoking.
Eventually, we contrast the decentral outcome with the smoking regime
choice of a social planer who is only conﬁned to choose quantities. We show
that again depending on the heterogeneity in the economy, the planer would
either completely ban smoking, allow smoking or opt for a mixed regime.
Importantly, however, the choice of the planer coincides with the decentral
choice of the duopolists. As such, implementing a smoking ban in an econ-
omy that was characterised by a smoking regime before the government in-
tervention (as in most, if not all, OECD countries) unambiguously decreases
welfare.
Highlighting the strategic incentives for bar owners in the abscence of a
publicly imposed smoking ban, we have presented a very stylised model. A
variety of undoubtedly important features such as externalities from smok-
ing, network mechanisms, and framing due to various exceptions in the laws
against smoking, have not been considered. Similarly, we have neglected dif-
ferences in bar size, and thus a priori ignored the wisdom that small bars
suﬀer from smoking bans, while large bars gain. Our framework can serve
as point of departure to address these questions. In view of the accumu-
lating data following the popularity of smoking bans, rigorous econometric
research is feasible to test the theoretical predictions. We leave this for future
research.
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Table 1: Payoﬀ Matrix